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This article looks at the history of post–war state–building in South Sudan through a 
study of one of the region’s many return migration projects. South Sudan was 
arguably the subject of the first state–led mass repatriation campaign of twentieth 
century Africa, after the first civil war that escalated in 1963 and ended in 1972 with 
the Addis Ababa Agreement. Using archival material from the newly–reformulated 
South Sudan National Archives in Juba, this paper examines this comparatively 
forgotten post–war return and reconstruction project in South Sudan from 1969 to 
1974. In this period, civil war ideas, staff and techniques were recycled into an 
apparently benevolent and “peace–building” project of Relief, Repatriation and 
Rehabilitation (RRR). The returns management project set out where the returning 
citizens of Sudan should go, how they should settle, live, and relate to the state. 
This study argues that this project developed and entrenched particular wartime state 
ideas of its imagined South Sudanese population, and the nature of its compact with its 
society. It argues for a longer view of the continuities of war– and peace–time 
population control, as a way to explore postcolonial ideas of “good government”. The 
return and resettlement period also demonstrates the South Sudanese populations’ 
expanding repertoire of engagement as post–war citizens: return migration and 
resettlement projects are good opportunities for people to reformulate their skills and 
tactics of negotiating, approaching, cheating and avoiding a “new” state. 
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This article looks at one of the first state–led mass repatriation campaigns of twentieth–
century Africa, after Sudan's first civil war ended in 1972. The civil war was brutal, 
particularly for the non–combatant population. Over the seven years after national 
independence in 1956, the postcolonial state’s relationship with its southern region's residents 
degenerated into full–blown war. Successive civil and military regimes maintained an 
escalatory, tit–for–tat conflict with the loosely–affiliated southern rebel bands collectively 
known as the Anyanya, particularly in Sudan’s far south and south–western territories. The 
1972 Addis Ababa Accord, negotiated between the Sudan Government under Gaffar Nimeiri 
and the unified Anyanya command under General Joseph Lagu, opened the way for a 
Southern Sudan regional administration, and the mass return of about half a million southern 
residents forced out of their homes: based on the disputed 1973 census figures for South 
Sudan, this was roughly 20% of the population. 
This generally forgotten post–war return project is a route to exploring the history of 
peri–war nation building. State authorities put forward visions of their geography, powers and 
understanding of their citizenry through their programmes of large–scale repatriation. Using 
archival material from the newly–revived South Sudan National Archives in Juba, this study 
demonstrates how civil war ideas, staff and techniques were reconfigured into the “peace–
building” project of Relief, Repatriation and Rehabilitation (RRR). This project did not create 
a radical new vista for a post–war state, but instead developed and entrenched wartime state 
ideas of its own power, its imagined civic population, and its understanding of its compact 
with this citizenry.  
This RRR period also demonstrates South Sudan’s post–war population’s own 
developing repertoire of engagement as citizens. These resettlement projects were (and are) 
opportunities for people to practice and refine their methods of managing, evading and 
manipulating a supposedly “new” post–war state, and for the state and population to contest a 
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language of good government and good citizenship. In its last section, this article picks up 
Emma Hunter's recent call for studies that “explore changing modes of engagement between 
governed and governors.”1 This study continues Cherry Leonardi and Christopher Vaughan’s 
history of the colonial politics of citizenship into the postcolonial period, beginning to trace 
popular multi–linguality in local and trans–local discourses of citizenship, rights and claim–
making into the post–colonial period. South Sudan’s archive holdings grow massively over 
1971 to 1974, as southern regional government offices expanded their bureaucratic aims and 
processes, and as increasing numbers of returning residents made written and oral complaints 
and appeals. These end–of–war files are compilations of various ideas of state authority, law, 
and power in multiple registers. The brief exploration of these holdings here further 
demonstrates Leonardi and Vaughan’s point that citizenship politics is central to state 
formation.2 
This study builds on a current historical turn in migration research.3 Migration and 
humanitarian studies literature has only recently started to explore the roots of migration and 
development theory in practice.4 This is particularly true for research on repatriation and 
resettlement post–conflict, a practical discipline growing alongside the rise of 
humanitarianism over the 1990s, as the idea became common policy under the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)’s “decade of repatriation.”5 This study takes histories 
of migration back to the 1960s and 1970s, and into wider political and discursive context. It is 
not a comparative history, but written with an eye towards continuing practices of peri– and 
post–conflict migration management today. South Sudan’s citizenry continues to be 
repatriated, relocated, and reconstructed, practically and conceptually; in the conclusion, I 
make some notes on the 2005–11 post–war return migration project leading to South Sudan’s 
referendum on independence, and on current discussions of population displacement and 
control. 
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From “peace” to peace: wartime return projects 
 
In general, conflict and post–conflict studies either assume (or are subject to the powerful 
structuring effect of) a path determinism of war–to–peace: from conflict resolution, to peace 
agreement, to resettlement, reintegration, and post–crisis reconstruction. Refugee returns are 
often held as symbolic of this teleology: as Jeffrey Crisp explains, “the voluntary repatriation 
and effective reintegration of uprooted people [is] an important manifestation of the transition 
to political stability and human security… it represents a very tangible form of progress.”6  
But antagonists consistently blur lines between war and peace throughout civil 
conflicts, and return and resettlement projects are also wartime tools. Sudan’s pre–, colonial, 
and postcolonial regimes and armed agents have a long heritage of violently manipulating 
local populations, and the first postcolonial civil war was no exception. As conflict escalated 
over 1956 to 1963, government forces and guerrilla fighters engaged in escalating cycles of 
punitive raiding and collective retribution against local populations across greater Equatoria, 
and increasingly in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal.7 At the same time, though, successive 
Sudan governments repeatedly asserted ceasefires, declared amnesties and demobilisation 
projects, entreated refugees and internally displaced people to return, and announced projects 
of “post–war” civic reconstruction – from 1964 onwards.8 A near–continuous amnesty was in 
force from 9 June 1969, following Gaffar Nimeiri’s coup; Nimeiri declared this amnesty at 
the same time as massively increasing the scale, military equipage, and violence of the civil 
war in the south.9 
The amnesty declaration on 9 June also created a Ministry for Southern Affairs 
(MSA), initially under the directorship of Joseph Garang, a southern Sudanese Communist 
Party member and experienced politician.10 The MSA’s peace–building and returns work 
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began during this intensification of mass violence and displacement. The main agents of this 
work were appointees known variously as peace officers, liaison officers for peace, or peace 
observers, working within local governments across the southern regions.11 These Peace 
officers were part of the amnesty law, intended – according to southern politician Abel Alier, 
speaking as Vice President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs to the post–peace 
agreement Relief and Resettlement Conference on 21 February 1972 –  
 
to encourage those refugees who wanted to return home but feared to do so, to come 
back without fear of prosecution for any crimes committed during the disturbances. … 
To help convey this to the refugee, Peace Officers were appointed in the various 
provinces, and peace delegates were also sent out to visit refugees in the neighbouring 
countries and explain to them the new policy and tell them they were free to come 
home in safety.12 
 
The files of the Ministry, as well as missionary correspondence from refugee camps in 
Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR), 
document repeated missions both within southern Sudan and across the borders. Peace 
officers and their delegations were engaged from 1969 in touring districts and provinces to 
proclaim the amnesty and convince people to return home. As one Liaison Officer for Peace 
explained in January 1970: “my main work is to go to the villages in the rural areas, to preach 
to the outlaws, to come home for peace.”13  
These were attempts to win hearts and minds, and to monitor them. A Western 
Equatoria peace officer, reporting on a visit to the borders of DRC, explained that he went 
 
firstly to assess the attitude of the Southerners outside... [and] to observe their feelings 
about returning to the Sudan. Secondly, I was to observe the morale of both armed and 
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unarmed Southerners there... to gauge the magnitude of rebel activities inside the 
Congo, to find out their sources of supplies.14 
 
Internal MSA correspondence regarding a delegation to Uganda literally underlined 
the need to convince “the DIE–HARDS” of the “new policy for the south.”15 MSA officials 
discussed possible large–scale repatriation projects with UNHCR in CAR in June 1970, a 
year and a half before the Addis Ababa Agreement – despite major rebel and government 
army attacks and atrocities against civilians along the borders with CAR and Uganda at the 
same time, for instance the massacre of 28 people by an armed group (allegedly the Sudan 
Armed Forces), who were roped together, shot, and burnt to death inside a church at Bamga 
in July 1970.16 
Very few people actually returned from displacement or abroad in this period. The few 
self–declared returnees in MSA paperwork and carbon copy flimsy files over 1969 to 1972 
were generally literate men and some women who returned to southern Sudan in the hope of 
resuming previous low–level civil service employment. These returnees were often heavily 
frustrated in their re–induction into regional government:  
 
Frankly speaking, one was convinced beyond belief at the downfall of the military 
regime and the immediate announcement of the General Amnesty... that things were 
quite different in the country.17 
 
The other returnees are more dubious. MSA internal statistics, where they were 
maintained, show dozens to a few hundred people moving into western and central Equatoria; 
these numbers are likely a combination of fiction, forced displacement or resettlement by the 
Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or one of a number of rebel factions, or agricultural migrants on 
the porous and mostly–uncontrolled mountain and forest borderlands. This is true also of the 
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few documents detailing rebel surrenders under the amnesty: a Peace and Security Report for 
Bahr el Ghazal Province in May 1970 asserted that 1200 “registered outlaws… surrendered 
for peace” and received amnesty law certificates; however, they turned in only 15 locally–
made guns.18 
Despite the possibly peace–minded intentions of some of these low–level officers and 
administrators, their amnesty and return migration work was a gloss on state tactics of 
population control and counter–insurgency. Their supposed beneficiaries and local partners 
were well aware of this: on 28 December 1971, chief Andrea Bol Aneil asked the Inspector of 
Local Government and a peace officer in Aweil why the amnesty continued to be extended, 
“because the present revolutionary government is [more] interested in outlaws than the 
ordinary people.”19 For the Sudan government, refugee returns work meshed well with (and 
provided a humanitarian front for) the forced encampment, relocation and collective violence 
against the southern population, all common tactics to isolate and undermine support and 
supply routes for the rebels by 1971.20 Defining a civilian population was more important 
rhetorically than practically, for both the Anyanya and the Sudan government: the apolitical 
refugee victims of the war were those who could be encouraged or forced to move; outlaws 
and rebel/government sympathisers were those who refused this offer of “peace”. As one 
regional representative wrote to the MSA in February 1971: 
 
the task of peace is pretty expensive, because there are only two major ways of getting 
information from the ordinary average person. One is to intimidate him by torture and 
the other is to entertain him. As a peace maker, the first method is out of my line, 








The negotiation and declaration of the Addis Ababa Accord peace agreement and the 
installation of a southern regional administration in Sudan in early 1972 changed the scale of 
the regional government’s engagement in population management, rather than the tone of it. 
In practice, the massive humanitarian refugee returns project following the peace agreement 
was not distinct from wartime population control: the local government inspector for Juba 
District observed in October 1972 that the “Reception, Relief, Rehabilitation, and 
Resettlement of Returnees became effective and serious after Addis Ababa Accord” – but 
that it did not begin in peacetime.22  
Civil war ideas, staff and techniques were recycled into the Relief, Repatriation, and 
Rehabilitation Commission (RRRC), established under the peace agreement in 1972. The 
RRRC’s remit was the monitoring and assistance of returning refugees and displaced people, 
and the design and management of explicitly short–term projects for emergency relief that 
carried on from the existing work of UN agencies.23 Planning began in earnest with the 
International Conference on Resettlement and Rehabilitation in Khartoum over 21–22 
February 1972, and with funding meetings with Oxfam, UNHCR, the International Council 
of Voluntary Agencies and other non–governmental aid agencies across Europe.24 The United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) committed $600,000 US dollars for returnee health 
services, and continued its existing programmes with a total budget of 2.34 million US 
dollars.25 The World Council of Churches (WCC) and Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) set 
up a Churches’ Relief and Rehabilitation Committee from Juba; the Catholic Relief Services 
(CRS) also signed a bilateral agreement with the Sudan government.26 The High Executive 
Council (HEC) for the southern region set out a total budget of $17.715 million US dollars 
for the year starting July 1972.27 This patchwork of funding was supposedly directed by the 
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government’s summary plans for relief and reconstruction – colloquially called the Pink 
Book and the Yellow Book – despite Save the Children Fund (SCF) internal correspondence 
noting that the figures and costs were badly thought through and massively underfunded.28 
This particular “Southern problem” continued to be dealt with by the bureaucrats and 
politicians of the civil war and pre–war.29 Many of the southern officials who were hired into 
the shoestring regional bureaucracy, particularly from 1971 onwards, were being hired back 
in: the surviving employment files of logistics staff, stores administrators, and resettlement 
officers for the RRRC, World Food Programme, and local government show that they were 
trained by and had often worked in the colonial and postcolonial governments.30 With the 
peace agreement in January 1972, the language changed (from “surrenders” into “returns”, 
for example), but these pre–peace agreement tactics, personnel, forms, files, and ideas 
continued.31  
Often, these politicians and civil servants understood themselves as the “Southern 
intellectuals,” responsible for, but not necessarily answerable to, the population of the 
southern region.32 Their approach to project management remained in the image of the 
postcolonial Sudanese vision of “bureaucracy and modernism”: as Leander Schneider 
observes of postcolonial Tanzania, this “constructed the state [as] the only authority 
competent to make judgments about the lives of a ‘backward’ population.”33 As a 
counterbalance to often Arabist, racist readings of “the Southern problem”, many of these 
administrators took up this paternalistic view of their responsibilities for their apparently 
tribalised, uneducated, politically passive (or ignorant), and fundamentally rural proletariat; 
an understanding strongly reminiscent of old colonial anthropology.34 This approach was 
echoed by their expatriate administrative counterparts in aid organisations and the UN, which 
– according to a British Embassy observer – suffered from “too much of the underlying 
missionary spirit, ministering ‘to the ignorant and incapable natives who simply get in the 
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way but must be looked after’.”35 As in Uganda, southern administrators were confident in 
their statistically–grounded knowledge of the right way to work: “government officers were 
confident that they had much to teach their constituents.”36 For the returns and reintegration 
programme, this meant a pedagogical effort by the two key categories of intermediaries in the 
south, the chiefs and the students, who would be guided to “enlighten [the people] on the 
necessity of living in big villages which will be the result of Resettlement.”37 Ambrose Wol, 
then Regional Director for National Guidance, wrote to his Undersecretary Brigadier Omer 
Mohed Said in 1970, “our people need re–educating.”38  
 
 
Rural return to a tribal “home” 
 
Their plans followed the pattern of refugee assistance critiqued famously by Barbara Harrell–
Bond in 1985: of initial relief aid and counting the population, and transport from refugee 
camps to reception camps; then the provision of land, tools, seeds, and primary education; 
and finally the withdrawal of aid when recipients are rightfully self–sufficient and 
integrated.39 The RRRC’s repatriation plan appears straightforward, rational, and managed, 
and echoes almost exactly the outline of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
and UNHCR’s managed returns model used from 2005 to 2011: 
 
The plan basically calls for a very accurate census to portray the number of potential 
returnees. The plan then aims at setting up reception centres [to] receive and cater for 
the refugees for a period of up to a week, after which the returnee is transported to his 
previous village.40 
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After this, each adult returnee was to be given one and a half Sudanese pounds, some 
clothes and a blanket, and cooking utensils for each family unit; they would be (in theory) 
supported with food aid by the WFP for eighteen months.41 This reintegration would be 
supported with extensive projects of education, health, and transport reconstruction.42 
These plans were premised on a particular understanding of the southern Sudanese 
population. At the core of resettlement planning was the essential idea that people would “go 
home”. These homes were specifically rural; as in the recent IOM repatriation programme of 
2005–11, people’s “home village” and “home area” was registered, and became their “final 
destination.”43 This continued a long colonial legacy of anti–urbanisation and population 
control in the south, as authorities sought to minimise urban centres’ creation of a population 
they saw as dangerously “detribalised”.44 The Local Government Act 1971 allowed local 
orders from People’s Executive Councils to control the movement of “idlers” and “social 
parasites”, adding this paperwork into colonial files labelled “Undesirables”.45 RRRC and 
WFP assistance focused on villages, hoping “to make life in the Village more attractive and 
keep the returning population on the land.”46 Model farms and road maintenance projects 
partly justified this forced ruralisation of urban returnees. In April 1973, the Equatoria 
Province authorities were “discussing with the Chiefs to remove the idle people from the 
town [of Juba] to go home and resettle in their villages and cultivate.”47 Demolition 
campaigns in Juba suburbs followed.48 
 
War–time peace villages 
 
The most explicit form of this continuing idea of “home villages” was the on–going 
villagisation programme – during the war, known as “peace villages”, “resettlement villages”, 
or “peace camps”, and after the peace agreement in 1972, more commonly termed “model 
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villages”.49 Peace villages were a wartime tactic used since at least 1966, to cut local supply 
lines and recruitment to the Anyanya guerrilla groups, and as a gloss on the government’s 
forced population movement, encampment and systematic violence against civilians. The 
Information and Social Affairs Mission to Bahr el Ghazal in 1966 explained that people 
would settle in the peace camps to “perform their normal duties”, under “a special committee 
for repatriation of the refugees.”50 The plans generally were, as a northern official put it 
mildly in mid–1969, 
 
to collect all the villages in the forests and situate them near the communication roads 
and supply them with necessary services, such as a police station, sanitary outpatients 
[clinic], schools; thus [this] will avoid the reason [for] the escape of those hinderers 
[sic] and keep peace to the inhabitants, who will avoid the shots of the rifles between 
the police and the govt. hinderers.51 
 
This was significantly more forcible than these documents articulated. Anyanya 
propaganda, seeing these camps and settlements as human shields for government troops, 
described how victims of army and rebel attacks on villages were frequently “resettled” by 
the state “into the so called ‘peace zones’.”52 These were intended, as an anonymous 
correspondent to the rebel politician Joseph Oduho explained in June 1966, 
 
a) to make propaganda to the world that everything is normal, though there will not be 
any thing called normal. Because who is going to see that these will have to be really 
peace zones and not trap zones? 
b) to brain–wash the people for election that should only be for unionists parties. 
c) to isolate the FF [Freedom Fighters] from the people so that they people may not 
help the FF. 
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d) to mow the people [sic] in such a way that no body escape as a refugee to tell the 
story to the world.53 
 
In early 1970, the Juba Statistics Office was specially tasked with enumerating and 
conducting censuses of the peace camps. After three months, and with very little information 
returned from Equatoria and Bahr el Ghazal Provinces, they reported that Juba Rural Council 
had created five camps; Tonj and Wau Town together controlled eight; and Upper Nile 
Province collectively ran twelve.54 Further peace camps were proposed across the southern 
region, partly because “present peace villages are so overcrowded.”55 Scopas Poggo, in one 
of the only histories of the first civil war written to date, notes that each man in these wartime 
peace villages was supposedly given four Sudanese pounds to build a family house, food 
rations for the first season, and seeds – a very similar provision, albeit a better financial deal, 
to the post–1972 RRRC support package.56  
These camps gradually became “model villages” in government documents by late 
1971.57 Resettlement villages were officially planned at the Sudan Resettlement Conference 
in Khartoum in February 1972, and were supported and funded by the WFP, WCC, SCF and 
UNHCR: 
 
The Commission on Resettlement has worked out a broad plan for the establishment 
of some forty ‘model’ villages to absorb returnees from the ‘bush’ as well as refugees 
returning from neighbouring countries... It is envisaged that each village will 
accommodate some 500 families, or approximately 2500 persons, and will include 
essential services.58 
 
These grew directly from wartime peace camps: Bishop Allison of the Anglican 
mission recommended that SCF work in Yei partly because “it was a government Peace 
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Camp housing some 4/5000 people and therefore has a nucleus for an expanding 
population.”59 The villages were intended “to absorb idle people who are presently in peace 
centres, those returning from the bush and neighbouring countries into Agriculture,” with an 
emphasis on returning to pre–war rural living, to “resume normal life”.60 
The regional ministries and Resettlement Commission set out a particular vision of 
normal life through these model villages. The 1970s repatriation projects – like their later 
versions from 2005–11 – emphasised returning people to what the administrators and 
community coordinators understood as their “ethnic territory”, through noting a returnees’ 
ethnicity, clan, paternal village, and the chief they lived under. A notice from Yambio Rural 
Council declared that “all the people… are to move to their previous residential areas”, 
especially those who had moved to government and market quarters, to live in teak 
plantations, in rebel areas, and “any other places which was not demarcated or allocated for 
residential areas” during the war.61 In 1972, chiefs were specifically “transported” to their 
villages, and returnees were told to “report” to their chiefs:62  
 
the policy is to encourage returnees to settle in their original homes; any restrictions 
which may discourage them from settling should not be imposed on them… provided 
they do not do so on somebody’s site.63 
 
These plans were a continuation, and entrenchment, of colonial and postcolonial 
constructions of the southern population as ethnically bounded to primordial tribal territories, 
and politically structured according to chiefs: as Leonardi observes, “people needed to be tied 
to chiefs to prevent scattering and chaos.”64 This history demonstrates Ferenc Marko’s recent 
point that South Sudanese citizenship is primarily defined ethnically: but it also evidences the 
long roots of this “ethnic turn” of post–2011 national citizenship law and practice.65 Recent 
research on Anyanya and Sudan government records from the first civil war over 1963–72 
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has shown how both sides attempted to fix local populations to ethnic territories, often 
violently – for instance with the Anyanya groups in Eastern Equatoria demanding that local 
ethnic communities support specific rebel commanders, dividing up populations and 
military/political authority according to an imagined patchwork of ethnic “home areas.”66 
Struggles over the utility and risks of tying personal belonging and identification, 
legitimate residence, and political representation to a specific, aggregated ethnicity and 
supposedly clear ethnic territory are a key theme in the history of South Sudanese political 
thought, standing in tension with ideas of individual citizen’s rights to representation and 
mobility across a horizontal national landscape, and at odds with old local practices of 
pastoral migration, resettlement, and inter–relationships.67 The RRRC’s imagining of the 
post–war topography of resettlement and rights continued this prioritisation of political 
tribalism. 
 
Resettlement in practice 
 
The RRRC’s organisational and statistical plans were wildly beyond local authorities’ actual 
powers to administrate. In August 1972, a frustrated RRRC official complained that “there 
are no organised offices of Resettlement to be found anywhere in the whole of Western 
Equatoria,” and that “proper statistics of returnees have not been kept.”68 Much like in 2011, 
the progress of repatriation was measured against a projected total figure for those internally 
and externally displaced by the war, with total “returnees” being subtracted from an original 
estimate: “like everyone else… Embassy staff suggest different figures for numbers of 
refugees returning (n.b. this includes D.P’s [displaced persons]) but between one and two m. 
[million] is the general opinion.”69 By the end of 1972, figures being sent back to the WFP 
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were estimates based on extrapolation from a handful of registration exercises, “by sheer 
deduction.”70 
The SSNA documents also do not demonstrate any clear processes on the ground; at 
most, they show the limited reach of the peacetime government. Most people who intended to 
come back to Sudan independently returned by mid–1973.71 The “main” reception centres at 
Nimule, Kaya, and Lasu were in practice “a small hut”, with “a local committee”.72 The 
principal impact of the RRRC and WFP projects was the disbursement of cash, food, and 
tools; an uneven, not necessarily well–targeted, and often poorly–managed process that 
resulted in some stores containing only cooking oil, or entirely rotten grain.73 Distribution of 
the quantities of food aid that did make it outside of the stores at Juba was dependent on the 
local organisational powers of individual WFP and RRRC employees, chiefs, teachers and 
teacher–parent associations, women's unions, priests, and students, with concomitant tensions 
over distribution and corruption.74 
This alternative history is starkly at odds with the rhetoric of the returns project. But 
regardless of the explicit failings of the RRRC, the planning and paperwork (and the 
possibility of “Resettlement and Reintegration”) was significant in framing a peace–time 
state and society.75 The post–peace regional government was materialised by statistical 
imagination and grand projects that demanded people speak its language, use its categories, 
and perform its bureaucracy, regardless of local effect or effectiveness. 
 
New citizens, and claiming the state 
 
Communities and individuals have made direct appeals to the government as citizens, 
claiming rights and demanding the state adhere to its own laws, since the early colonial 
period. Many of their tactics used to negotiate the RRRC were long–standing: V. N. G. Loro, 
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the Local Government Inspector for Juba, complained in April 1972 that “the people of Torit 
District are pouring in to Juba claiming to be returning from Uganda. This is very difficult to 
[dis]prove.”76 
But return to southern Sudan in the early 1970s, even if unassisted by the RRRC, 
provided one of the first widespread opportunities for increasingly literate postcolonial 
populations to make claims on their “new” state. In the South Sudan National Archives, while 
there are district and province–level files filled with such complaints and demands stretching 
back to the 1920s, these files multiply hugely from 1971 onwards. This could be due to the 
vagaries of filing and termites, but as well as formal complaint files, surviving flimsy files 
(carbon copies of correspondence usually removed from main files) document this 
proliferation of appeals, complaint letters and petitions – and concomitantly, the increasingly 
southern–staffed regional government’s filing of these demands, and sometimes their 
responses. As with the letters from the 1930s to the 1950s, it is hard to tell whether the chiefs 
and students often signing these letters on behalf of a wider constituency really had one; but 
many are collective petitions, with dozens of signatures and thumbprints in ink. Many are 
also transcriptions of oral complaints brought to offices, and thus not only a sample of local 
(male) literati with access to pen and paper.77 They evidence the opportunities for door–
stepping that the re–opening of district level peacetime government offices brought, and their 
petitioners’ wartime experience of negotiating national and international refugee laws, 
bureaucracy, and languages. 
These letter–writers demanded that the Sudanese state live up to its own rhetoric of 
peace, even during the civil war. In 1970, after Nimeiri’s coup and his declaration of a 
socialist revolution, the newly–reorganised Lou Student Union, Akobo Teachers’ 
Representative, and Akobo Officials Union wrote collectively to the new president, on the 
basis that his declared “new phase” after the revolution – which should have brought “radical 
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change” – was not forthcoming in Akobo. “If such a climate continues, the people of that 
District will be deprived of their inalienable rights offered by their mighty Revolution.” They 
complained specifically of 
 
…the abominable acts committed by the Police. They have instilled fear and anxiety 
in the hearts of the Citizens by wilfully threatening to covet girls and women in their 
decent homes. … We believe in a Government which follows democratic practices 
and recognises the right to live.78 
 
These letters demonstrate the wide reach of democratic and legal discourse, and a 
working knowledge of the terms and terminology of Nimeiri’s revolution; letter writers were 
swift to pick up the Nimeiri regime’s socialist language of comradeship.  
These petitions were demanding to see what peace actually meant in practice for the 
rights of citizens and responsibilities of the state. Fabio Nyikuai, a junior clerk before the 
war, started his letter of June 1972: “I am hereby begging for what I believe to be part of my 
official right.”79 Nyikuai was charged in 1964 for subversion, under the emergency 
provisions of the Defence Act 1958, and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment by a court 
martial; he was claiming his official right to be reinstated to his former position, under the 
amnesty declared later in 1964. This post–war right to demand that the state adhere to its own 
peace– and war–time laws is made explicit in another appeal to Abel Alier: “now, I think, I 
have the right to ask for settling my case finally, and thanks.”80 The Anuak Southern 
Sudanese Refugees in Gambella, writing collectively with a list of names and thumbprints to 
the Chairman of the RRRC in August 1972, explained: 
 
We... feel greatly honoured to be able to submit this short report to you as free citizens 
of the Sudan. It is not presumptuous that we as a part of Sudan nation should approach 
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our nation and leaders, nor is it unseemingly [sic] that we should state to our 
Government the role we should now be playing in the building up of the nation.81 
 
Repeated amnesties, declarations of peace, and “new” governments gave constituents 
renewed opportunities to demand their new rights as citizens; while their rhetoric was 
idealistic, their specific demands addressed local realities of fragmented and violent 
government. And while returning residents used this language of citizenship, democracy, and 
all–inclusive national law, they were also multilingual, making use of other referents and 
registers to best position themselves as an authoritative “good citizen”.82 Many petitioners 
wrote themselves simultaneously as individual citizens claiming their legal rights, and as 
stalwart members of a specific ethnic and rural collective, fitting into the government’s dual 
imagining of both itself and its population – as a modern state with laws and rules, and as the 
manager of a ruralised patchwork of tribes. Successful appeals – ones which receive a 
response – balance the individual and collective identity of being a post–war southern citizen, 
managing to call on both of Mamdani’s stark categories of urban individual citizens, and 
rural, ethnicised and chief–led subjects. 
The southern intellectuals of the post–war administration closely policed access to this 
discourse of citizenship. They did not necessarily deny rural residents the right to speak as 
citizens – as per Mamdani’s overly rigorous binary – but set the limits to what appeals could 
be made, and how they could be phrased, as a modern, individual Southern citizen. Many 
comments by government staff in the marginalia of these files sneer at what they see as the 
jungle legalese of overtly modernist, individualist appeals. For instance, Mica Bol Ciengau, a 
worker in Rumbek hospital, appealed over unequal pay in the wards: “I have been deprived 
from my ideal right as a citizen of this our beloved country the SUDAN.” A marginal note by 
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Abel Alier, rejecting his appeal, reads: “he has even read a bit of Karl Marx on wages and 
dialectical materialism: [he quotes from Ciengau’s letter:] ‘Equal pay for equal job’ !”83  
 
The end of peace–building 
 
By the end of 1973, the resettlement offices and stores were closing down, often just because 
supplies had been exhausted or people had moved away.84 Reconstruction work was dogged 
with large scandals, such as the TECMA affair, with £164,000 Sudanese pounds invested by 
two ministry directors in a dodgy company for roads that were never built; the disappearance 
of £50,000 Sudanese pounds donated by the UNHCR for educational supplies; and the 
Energo Projikt’s hugely delayed and massively expensive construction of the parliament 
building by 1974.85 The food aid–centred WFP Project 634 fell apart by 1975, with support 
being reformulated into other rural development projects because of endemic 
mismanagement and corrupt accounting.86 In the district–level files, it is hard to tell what is 
incompetence, duplicitous reporting, or outright theft: for instance, a resettlement officer 
reported that the storekeeper of Juba District, with his assistants and 30 returnee residents, 
confronted the RRRC storekeeper and threatened him with sticks and knives until he issued 
80 sacks of grain to them.87 
Despite certain dubious measures of post–conflict success – the British foreign office 
celebrated “success in political institution building” by noting that “three sets of elections 
have been held” – two years of peace–building started to visibly fall apart by 1974.88 The 
RRRC’s closure sparked demonstrations in February by residents of the Gumbo returnee 
reception centre in Rejaf, by staff at Juba Civil Hospital, and labourers on the Mundri to 
Maridi road, among many other small protests and riots in 1974 to 1975, primarily over job 
losses and unpaid earnings.89 The RRRC was shut down on 31 March 1974.90 Its work was 
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not celebrated. The near–contemporary assessment by South Sudanese academic Elias 
Nyamlell Wakoson called it “the worst–handled resettlement and rehabilitation program in 
the world”: “what happened in the southern Sudan was partial resettlement but no 






Sudan’s wartime and post–war resettlement projects are, in many ways, a good example of 
James Scott’s state: its “efforts at sedentarization… [were an] attempt to make a society 
legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of 
taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion,” to clarify its subjects through mapping 
them in ethnically distinct villages each with a clear chiefly authority.92 The new regional 
administration was drawing Mamdani’s sharp distinction between rural and urban, asserting a 
“rural world of tradition and kinship” where their civilian population resided, and their ability 
to govern and look after it.93 
This research demonstrates the utility of historical explorations of mass migration and 
population management in examining the evolution of state imagination and citizenship 
politics. This RRR period allowed South Sudan’s elusive and savvy population to expand its 
repertoire of “citizen” engagement. The South Sudan National Archives complaints files are 
compilations of the renewed tactics of returning citizen–subjects, in (re–)gaining experience 
of negotiating a Sudanese state. Even if the state was poorly–managed or near–invisible in 
practice, people were still revising a new discursive system: updating their vocabulary as 
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refugees, returnees and citizens, and working across Mamdani’s sharp divide of urban 
citizenship and rural ethnic community. 
This article traces the postcolonial roots of some contemporary norms and logics of 
governance in South Sudan. Wartime population controls and post–war reconstruction 
projects since 1969 have both centred an idea of primordial ethnic homelands, represented by 
chiefs and defended by locally–rooted rebel (or state) forces. Marko recently argued that 
independent South Sudan “reintroduce[d] ethnicity into the practice of citizenship” after 
independence in 2011, and thus “returned to the colonial logic of indirect rule”; I would argue 
instead that local political theory has developed and evolved ideas of “home territory” and 
political tribalism since the colonial period, and that these ideas have remained fundamental 
to conceptions of governance and citizenship for both rebel and state agents.94 
The debate over political geography and constituency in South Sudan underpins 
discussions of sub–division, ethnic homelands, and self–representation from the late 1970s to 
today, as well as more drastic deportations and forced movements of families and 
communities considered to be “outside of their area” during the re–division of the Southern 
Region in 1983, known as the “Kokora” period. As Lazarus Leek Mawut emphasised in 
1986: “the practice in the South is that every person must return to his roots. Thus citizens of 
Upper Nile must go to Upper Nile Region. The same applies to Bahr el Ghazal and 
Equatoria.”95 Practices of coercive population management rooted in the first civil war, 
legitimated by humanitarian “return” practices post–war, have worked to entrench the ideas 




Post–script: today’s population management projects 
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The managerial ideas of post–conflict reconstruction and resettlement detailed here will be 
familiar to some readers. The massive logistical, bureaucratic, and quantitative efforts of the 
UNHCR and IOM from 2005 to repatriate, resettle, and reintegrate generations of displaced 
South Sudanese people as a post–conflict nation–building project echo the projects of the 
1970s, despite being significantly better staffed, resourced, and practically conceptualised.97 
The maps, way–stations, enumeration, and quantitative reporting of the RRR projects of 
2005–2011 were burdened by the same concepts: the need to return people to (rural) “home 
areas”, in line with their ethnic origin and chiefly authorities – and, in the process, erasing or 
overriding personal histories of intermarriage, urbanisation, and migration, despite three 
decades of criticism from practitioners and scholars on the meaning and experience of return 
“home.”98 This post–war return project received many of the same criticisms as its 1970s 
counterpart, not least that its data on returnee numbers was dubious, that its promises were 
too great, and its projects disjointed and often badly managed.99 
Like Geiger, Pécoud, and Easton–Calabria have all recently observed, historical 
research into past refugee and returnee projects undermines their claims to innovation.100 
Such projects often emphasise post–war peace and reconstruction as the antithesis of violent 
disorder – a shift, in common South Sudan parlance, from the bullet to the ballot, and a 
natural progression to rule of law and state protection: as B. S. Chimni stated, “of course, 
going back ‘home’ also means regaining citizenship rights.”101 
But this study emphasises that population management in Sudan is part of a wider 
theory of governance that spans war and peacetime, and is common to both rebels and state 
officials.102 Forcible relocation to “peace camps” (or “villages”) have been a constant in 
Sudan’s civil war history, used maybe most horrifically in the Nuba Mountains and across 
greater Kordofan in the 1990s by the Bashir regime, employing the language of refugee 
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protection and social reconstruction to further population control, violence, and securitisation. 
This is one extreme of a broader history of forced movement and manipulation of 
populations, refugee camps or returnee groups by both Sudanese and South Sudanese 
government and armed forces, such as the bulldozing of irregularly–settled neighbourhoods 
in central Khartoum and Juba over the 1960s to present.103 Modernist, quantitative, 
developmentalist states have the tools to justify coercive, paternalist, and sometimes violent 
practices of “management”.104 Histories of development projects demonstrate Maureen 
Hickey’s and Schneider’s point that development policy discourse often empowers or 
underpins authoritarianism.105 If mass migration and return projects after civil wars are to 
help in “building nations”, or assist new residents in claiming and shaping their renewed 
national citizenship, it is imperative that these projects are cognisant of these historical state 
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